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Abstract 
In the Constitution Act, 1982, the federal government and the provinces made 
a bargain regarding Senate reform: while Parliament may generally make minor 
changes to the Sena1~e unilatera/Jy, certain specified changes, including changes to 
the method of select:ing Senators, require provincial consent. This bargain reflects 
the fact that Senate reform would affect both federal and provincial interests, 
given the Senate's alual role as a house of the federal Parliament and, at least 
ideally, as a means try which provincial and regional interests are represented in 
Ottawa. The Harpe1r government's efforts to unilaterally provide for the election 
of "Senate nominee$," most recently via Bill C-7, would subvert this bargain. 
This article argues that this proposal is unconstitutional and will likely be held as 
such by the Supremt? Court of Canada in the upcoming SenateJ!£orm reference. 
It also argues, however, that the Harper governmenfs proposar to impose non-
renewable term limits on Senaters is constitutional and would not upset the 
bargain laid out in t:he Constitution Act, 1982. Finally, this article argues more 
broadly that preseming the role that the Constitution Act, 1982 guaranteed to 
the provinces in shc.rping Senate reform is the best way to uphold not only the 
text of thtf Constitr.ttion, but the principles of democracy and federalism that 
undergird it. 
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I. tNTRIOOUCTION 
In the Constitution Act, 1982 (the "1982 Act"), the federal government and 
the provinces made a bargain regarding Senate reform: while Parliament may 
generally make minor changes to the Senate unilaterally, certain enumerated 
changes, including changes to the method of selecting Senators, require 
provincial assent.• This bargain reflects the fact that Senate reform would affect 
both federal and provincial interests, given the Senate's dual role as a house of 
the federal Parliament and, at least ideally, as a means by which provincial and 
regional inter•ests are represented in Ottawa. 
But in an attempt to sidestep perennial disagreements berween the federal 
government alnd the provinces over how the Senate should be reformed, the 
Harper government has repeatedly requested that Parliament enact changes 
without prior provincial approval, most recently via Bill C-7.2 Bill C-7 would 
have imposed nine-year, non-renewable term limits on newly appointed Senators 
(subject to mandatory retirement at age 75) and sanctioned provincially-
organized ele·ctions for "Senate nominees", whom the Prime Minister would 
need to consider before recommending Senate appointments to the Governor 
General. Facing serious questions as to the constitutionality of these proposals,) 
the Harper-government has initiated a reference to the Supreme Court of Canada 
(the" Re{eren.~e").~ 
This articlle focuses on the constitutionality of the reforms that have been 
proposed in both Bill C-7 and the Reference, in light of the federal -provincial 
bargain made: in the 1982 Act. It argues that, while Parliament has the power 
to impose the term limits proposed in Bill C-7, it lacks the power to authorize 
the election olf Senate nominees by the provinces. This latter reform would have 
the effect of transforming the Senate into an elected body, and as such may only 
be effected b)' constitutional amendment with the consent of the provinces as 
provided by paragraph 42(1)(b) of the 1982 Act. 
This artide proceeds as follows. Part II places Bill C-7 in context by reviewing 
the structure and roles of the Senate, along with recent proposals for Senate 
reform. Part lll .(eviews the constitutionality of the reforms proposed in Bill 
C-7. Part IV departs from the strictly legal discussion in Part III to consider 
the broader principles of federalism and democracy (which have been held to 
undergird Canada's constitutional and political traditions), and the implications 
Co1'1Stitu1rion Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 111982 
Act(. 
2 Bill C-7, An Act respecting the selection of Sn14tors and amending the Constitution Act, 
1867 in r·espect of Senate term limits, 1st Sess, 41st Pari, 2011 (1st reading 21 june 2011) 
1 Bill C-7tl. 
3 See e.g., Daniel Leblanc, "Onawa to press court on Senate", The Globe and Mail (17 
Septemb<:c 2012) Al; Senate, Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, 
"Bill S-4, An Act to amend the Constitution Act, 1867 (Senate tenure): Observations 
to the R,eport of the Standing Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs" 
in ]ourmrls of the Senate, 39th Pari, 1st Sess, No 106 (12 June 2007) at 1655 )Bill S.4 
Observations!. 
4 PC 2013·70. 
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the reforms proposed in Bill C-7 may have for these principles.5 It argues that 
the best means of Uipholding both of these principles is to preserve the role that 
the 1982 Act guaranteed to the provinces in shaping Senate reform. 
11. SENATE REFCIRM IN CONTEXT 
This section places Bill C-7 in context by describing the structure and roles of 
the Senate. It also dliscusses the adoption of elected Senates by the United States 
and Australia, two countries with strong historical ties to Canada. Finally, it 
describes some of tine Canadian Senate refor.m proposals that preceded Bill C-7. 
i. The Structure o11 the Senate 
; , ~ 
The Senate has bee1n a part of the Parliament of Canada since Confederation in 
1867.6 Modeled pa.rtly on the appointed Legislative Councils that existed in the 
pre-Confederation provinces and the UK House of Lords/ the Senate consists 
of members appointed by the Governor General pursuant to the Constitution 
Act, 1867 (the "18•67 Act").8 To be eligible for appointment to the Senate, one 
must have attained the age of 30 and meet certain citizenship, residency, and 
property require~ents.9 Initially, Senators could serve for life, but the 1867 Act 
was later amended to provide that Senators could serve only until reaching the 
age of75.10 
Senators enjoy 1the same privileges, powers, and immunities as members of 
the House of Commons, except for the capacity to introduce money bills." The 
Senate carries an absolute veto o.ver all ordinary legislation, but it has only a 
suspensive veto of 180 days in respect of constitutional amendments (unless 
the amendment is made ·by Parliament unilaterally, in which case the Senate 
maintains an absolute veto). 12 
Seats in the Senate are distributed according to the principle of equality of 
regions.U The four "Divisions" of Canada-Ontario, Quebec, the Maritimes, 
and the western provinces-hold 24 seats each; a further six seats are reserved 
5 See Reference ReSecession of Quebec, )199812 SCR 217 at para 32, 161 DlR (4th) 385 
)Secession Refet·enal. 
6 ConstitullonAct,1867 (UK),30 & 31 Vict,c 3,s 17,reprinted in RSC 1985,Appii,No 
511867 Act). 
7 See janet Ajzens:tat, "Bicameralism and Canada's Founders: The Origins of the Canadian 
Senate" in Serge, Joyal, cd, Protecting Canadian Democracy: The Senate You Never Knew 
(Ottawa: Canadlian Centre for Management Development, 2003) 3. 
8 1867 Aa, supra note 6, s 24. 
9 Ibid, s 23. 
10 Constitution Act, 1965, 14 Elit II, c 4, Pt I (Can}, s 1. 
11 1867 Act, supra note 6, ss 18, 53. 
12 1982 Act, supra note 1, s 44. After the 180-day threshold passes, the House of Commons 
may adopt the atmendment resolution a second time, after which the amendment may be 
proclaimed despite it not receiving Senate approval (provided any applicable provincial 
approvals ace m.et). 
13 1867 Act, supra note 6, s 22. 
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for Newfoundland and Labrador, and the three territories each hold one Senate 
seat.•• 
il. Roles of the Senate 
The Senate has been said to fulfill three primary roles: to represent and protect 
regional interests, to revise legislation, and to investigate matters of public 
interest.15 Senators also play a fourth, more partisan role, in furthering the 
political interests of the Prime Minister who recommends their appointment.16 
a. The Representative Role 
At the pre-Confederation Quebec Conference of 1864, several delegates 
expressed a hope that the Senate would play a role in upholding the balance of 
power between the federal government and the provinces.17 The Senate is widely 
seen as having failed to play this role, which is today carried out by the provincial 
premiers, and to some extent by the federal Cabinet. 18 Given the potential for a 
reformed Senate to reassume this role, and in so doing either amplify or dilute 
premiers' political influence (depending on the nature of such reform), it comes 
as little surprise that provincial premiers have shown a consistent interest in 
Senate reform. 19 
b. The Legislative Role 
The drafters of the 1867 Act intended that the House of Commons would be the 
primary originator of legislation and that the Senate's legislative role would be 
limited to the refinement and revision of such legislation. 20This division of labour 
14 Ibid, ss 21-22. Sections 26-27 also permit the Governor General to appoint one or two 
additional ~nators from each division; this provision was likely intended co allow the 
Prime Minister to force House of Commons bills through the ~nate in the event of a 
deadlock between the two Houses. See Reference Re ConstitutioMI Question Act, ( 1991) 
53 BCLR (2d) 335 at 353, 78 DLR (4th) 245 (CA). 
15 See Senate, Standing Commirree on lnrernal Economy, Budgets and Administration, 
The Sendft'R'eport on Activities 2010 (Ottawa: Senate Standing Committee on Internal 
Economy, Budgets and Administration, 2010) at 39. 
16 See Pan IT-B-4, below. 
17 Sir john A Macdonald, for example, argued that the Senate would wprotect local 
interests~ ~e Parliamentary debates on the subject of the confederatzon of the Brttish 
North American provinces, 3rd sess, 8th Provincial Parliament of Canada (~bee City: 
Hunter, Rose & Co, 1865) at 35]Q~bec Conference(. 
18 CES Franks, wThe Canadian ~nate in Modern Times~ in Serge Joyal, ed, Protecting 
Canadian Democmcy: The Senate You Never Knew (Ottawa: Canadian Centre for 
Management Development, 2003) 151 at 151; Daniel J Savoie, Governing from the 
Centre: the concentration of pown in Canadian politics (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1999) at 348. 
19 See Pan li-D below. 
20 George Brown, for instance, called for a "thoroughly independent~ Senate that could 
"canvass dispassionately~ measures pa~d by the House of Commons. Macdonald 
agreed that an appointed ~nate should provide wthe sober second thoughtm legislation~; 
Quebec Conference, supra note 17 at 35, 90. 
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prevents legislative deadlock and reflects the principle of responsible government, 
whereby the government must enjoy the confidence of, and is therefore ultimately 
controlled by, the representative house of Parliament.21 Delegates to the Quebec 
Conference believed that, if the Senate were elected, Senators would feel they 
had a political mandate to frustrate the work of the House of Commons-if 
so, the will of a house selected on the basis of regional representation could 
thwart that of a ho~se chosen on the basis of representation by population, and 
the principle of responsible government would be undermined.22 An appointed 
Senate with no mandate from the electorate, on the other hand, could be relied 
upon to defer to the considered will of the House of Commons, much like the 
UK House of Lords.H The Senate has not strayed far from this role. Although 
it has occasionally obstructed government initiatives,24 the Senate rarely rejects 
House of Commons bills outright; in fact, it has done so o~tY, ~ve times since 
1990.25 
c. The Investigative Role 
[n practice, the Senate's most valuable work is likely the investigative and policy 
development work undertaken by its committees. This function is similar to 
that of Royal Commissions, however the Senate is able to carry out such work 
at a lower cost because it employs permanent research sta£f.26 Senators are also 
seen as better-fitted to this role than Members of Parliament ("MPs") because 
21 Andrew Heard, Canadian Constitutional Conventions: The Marriage of Law and Politiu 
(Toronto: Oxford University Press,1991) at 50·52)Heard, Convent•ons). 
22 See e.g., Quebec Conference, supra note 17 at 88-90. 
23 Ibid at 90. See also Alpheus Todd, On Parliamentary Government in EngL2nd: its origin, 
development, and practical operation, Vol 1 {London: Longman, Green & Co, 1867) at 
21; AV Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, 10th ed {London: 
Macmillan, 1962) at 458-61. 
24 See e.g., Christina McCall-Newman, Grits: An Intimate Portrait of The Liberal Party 
(Toronto: Macmillan, 1982) at 314-15 {destribing the Senate's role in obstructing the 
Trudeau government's interventionist economic policies); Gary Levy, "A Crisis Not Made 
in a Day" in Perer H Russell & Lorne Sossin, eds, Parliamentary Democracy in CriSis 
{Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009) 19 at 22 {describing the Senate's role in 
obstructing cenain democratic reforms championed by the Harper government). 
25 These were {1) Bill C-43 {1990) on abonion; (2) Bill C-93 {1993), which would have 
merged the Canada Council with the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council; 
{3) Bill C-28 {1996), which would have cancelled a government contract regarding 
Pearson International Airpon; (4) Bill C-220 (1998), an arrempt to prohibit profiting 
from authorship respecting a crime that critics alleged was overbroad; and {5) Bill C-311 
(2010), which would have set carbon emissions reduction targets the government argued 
were impossible to meet. See Parliament of Canada, "PARUNFO," online: Parliament of 
Canada <http://www.parl.gc.ca/Parllnfo> IPARLINFOJ (Navigate to: Legislation > Bills 
sent to the other House rhat did not receive Royal Assent). 
26 Brian O'Neal, Senate Committees: Role and Effectiveness (Ottawa: Library of Parliament, 
1994) at 24-25. 
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they tend to have more legislative experience,27 more time to develop expertise 
in a particular policy area (since Senate committee membership is relath•ely 
stable and Senators do not have to carry out the constituency and political W;ork 
expected of MPs), and more institutional freedom to question the position!: of 
their parties (as they have little chance of being appointed to Cabinet and no 
fear of being removed from office by their party leaders). 28 
d. The Partisan Role 
Although he or she cannot remove Senators from office, the Prime Minister 
can use Senate appointments to further the interests of the governing party by 
appointing party organizers and other loyal partisans. The partisan nature~ of 
most appointments is often cited as evidence that the Senate is in desperate need 
of reform. 29 But not all Senate appointments are partisan-Prime Ministers have 
often recommended the appointment of independent or opposition Senators, 
either out of a desire to improve the caliber of the Senate's membership or ou·t of 
a desire to deflect criticism of their more partisan appointments.30 In fact, every 
Prime Minister since Louis St. Laurent who has served more than one yea1~ in 
office (with the exception of Prime Minister Harper) has appointed at least one 
independent or opposition Senator, apparently to boost the ranks of the Sentate 
opposition when it became unacceptably small.Jl 
27 As of 2013, the average Senator had 8 years, 4 months of federal legislative experience, 
while the average MP had 6 years, 6 months of federal legislative experience. Of cw-cent 
MPs, 7% (24 of 308) had served in a provindallegislarure,compared to 19% of current 
Senators (19 of 102). A larger proporcion of MPs have, however, served in municipal 
govemm·ent (64 of 308 MPs, or 21%, compared ro 18 of 102, or 17%, of Senators). 
Sec PARLINFO, supra note 25 (Navigate to: Senate > Pohtical Information; Hous•e of 
Commons > Political Information). 
28 O'Neal, supra note 26 at 2. 
29 See e.g. Richard J Brennan, "Harper dubbed 'patronage king"', Toronto Star (28 August 
2009) A6 (quoting Prime Minister Harper's Conservative parry leadershtp campaign 
as stating that "ldlespite the fine work of many individual senators, the upper house 
remains taampi.ng ground for the favoured cronies of the Prime Minister"). 
30 Pot a list of the more highly regarded historical appointees, see Senate, Committees 
Dire<:rorate and Private Legislation, The Ca'ltldian Senate.in Foeti$: 1867-1993 {Ottawa: 
Senate, Commicrees Directorate and Priv<~te Legislation, 1993) at 26·36. For views as to 
which of the more recent appointees to the Senate can be seen as highly-regarded, see 
Tyler Dawson, "Five things to love about Canada's Senate:", The {Montrti41] Gazette (25 
May 2013) A8; "Reasons to reflect on Senate choices", Toronto Star (21 December 20108) 
A22. 
31 PARLINFO, supra note 25 (Navigate to: Senate > Senators). Though Prime Minister 
Harper has yet to follow in this tradition, one could argue that the Conservatives do 
not yet hold enough seats in the Senate to make opposition appointments necessary. For 
instance, when Prime Minister Marcin first appointed opposition members, the governing 
Liberals held 64 of 98 Senate sears (seven sears remained vacant after the appointments). 
The present Conservative government matched this threshold in 2013. As of june 2013, 
the Conservatives hold 60 of 102 Senate seats that were not vacant; mere are also five 
independent senators who have caucused with the Conservatives in che past. See Senate, 
Senate of Ca®da: Annual R.eport 2004-2005 (Orcawa: Senate of Canada, 2005) at 12··16; 
PARLINFO, ibid (Navigate to: Senate > Representation > Parry Standings). 
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iii. Possible Models for Reform: The United States and Australia 
Nonetheless, the public's evident distaste for the use of public funds to support 
the Prime Minister's partisan interests, together with the apparent incompatibility 
of an appointed legislative house with a democratic society, have spurred calls 
for Senate reform. 32 Senate reform advocates can look to at least two possible 
models for elected Senates in federal states that enjoy strong historical and 
cultural ties with Canada: the Senates of the United States and Australia. 
a. The United States Senate 
The bicameral United States Congress, which includes a House of Representatives 
elected based on the principle of representation by population and a Senate 
elected based on the principle of equality of states, was the product of the 
Connecticut Compromise of 1787. This satisfied large states' demand for 
representation in Congress in proportion to their share of the population of the 
new country while addressing smaller states' fear that their interests would be 
disregarded by the larger states.33 
The Connecticut Compromise was more than a political compromise. It 
was also an attempt to reconcile the principle of representative democracy with 
that of federalist democracy.l-4 The House of Representatives would represent 
the United States as a single people and a single country, while the Senate 
would represent the states as autonomous communities, each of which had 
made a sovereign decision to join the United States and so were entitled to be 
treated as sovereign equals within the new federation.JS The Senate's role as 
the representative of states' interests in Washington is reflected in the fact that, 
before enactment of the Seventeenth Amendment providing for a directly elected 
Senate,. Senators were elected by state legislatures rather than by the public at 
large.36 
While some continue to argue that the Senate gives small states a 
disproportionate degree of power, the United States Congress as presently 
constituted reflects the ideal of "checks and balances" that pervades that 
32 For recent proposals (other than the Senate reform bills presented by the Harper 
government), see e.g. "Get rid of the Senate, Saskatchewan Prem1er says with party's 
backmg" Canadian Press (8 july 2013), online: The Globe and Mail <http:l/www. 
theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/get-nd-of-the-senate•saskatchewan-premier-s:~,ys 
wirh-partys-backinglarcicle130667021>; The Hon Dan Hays, "A New Senate for Canada: 
A Two-Step Process for Moving Forward on Senate Reform" (Calgary: Canada West 
Foundation, 2010), online: CWP <http:J/cwf.calpdf-docslpublications/a-new•senate-for-
canada-2008.pdf>. 
33 Richard Beeman, The Penguin Guide to the Umted States Um$titution (London: Penguin, 
2010} at 154-56. 
34 james Madison, "The Federalist No. 39" in Benjamin Fletcher Wright, ed, The Federalist 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1966} 280. 
35 Ibid at 280-86. 
36 The United States Senate only became a directly elected body after the enactment of the 
Seventeenth Amendment in 1913. See Bee.man, su{lfa note 33 at 80-81. 
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country's Cor.tstitutionY By providing a federal check on the representative 
power of the House, it ensures that a national majority will not be able to run 
roughshod ov•er the wishes of a discrete minority of states. 
b. The Austn•lian Senate 
Australia also sought a balance between federal and representative democracy 
but, like Canada, it also had to reconcile this balance with the principle of 
responsible government.18 The Australian framers achieved this balance by 
designing a mechanism to prevent legislative deadlock between the Senate 
and the Hou~~ of Representatives, ensuring that, where the two houses cannot 
come to agreement on legislation, the will of the House of Representatives will 
generally control. 39 
This mechanism is found in section 57 of the Australian Constitution.40 
It provides that where the House of Representatives passes the same piece of 
legislation twiice within a three-month interval, and where that legislation is 
both times either rejected by the Senate or passed with amendments to which the 
House will no·t agree, the Governor General may dissolve both houses and call 
elections for each (a process called "double dissolution"). lf the newly elected 
houses fail to agree on the same legislation, it is considered at a joint session 
of both housc:s, at which point the House of Representatives, with its larger 
membership, would likely control the outcome of the vote. 
tv. Senate Re·form Initiatives and the 1979 Reference 
Calls for refotrm of the Canadian Senate date back over a century.~1 Modern 
proposals can be roughly divided into two groups. First, the "House of the 
Federation" model would have allowed provincial governments a role in 
selecting Senators similar to that played by American state legislatures prior 
to the enactment of the Seventeenth Amendment. The Trudeau government's 
attempt to unilaterally reform the Senate in accordance with this model gave 
rise to the Reference Re Authority of Parliament in relation to the Upper House 
(1979) {the "Hil79 Reference"), which resulted in the Supreme Court of Canada's 
only statemen1t on the constitutionality of unilateral Senate reform to date.42 The 
second model for reform is the elected Senate model, which will be addressed in 
the ongoing Reference. 
37 See e.g . .A.khil Reed Amar, H0f Sovereignty and Federalism" (1987) 96 Yale LJ 1425 at 
1494. 
38 Nicholas Aroney, The Constitution of a Federal Commonwealth: The Making and 
MMning of the Australian Coi!Stitution (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009) at 
189. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act, 1900 (UK), 63 & 64 Viet, c 12, s 57. 
41 See Roben M Dawson, Constitutional Issues in Canada 1900-1931 (London: Oxford 
Universit)r·Press, 1993) at 283. 
42 Referen~· Re Authority of Parliament in relation to the Upper. House 1198011 SCR 54, 
(sub nom Reference Re Legislative Authority of Parliament to Alter or Replace the Senate) 
102 DLR (3d) 1}1979 Reference!. 
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a. The House of the Federation Model 
In 1978, the Trudeau government introduced Bill C-60, which proposed that 
the Senate be replaced by a "House of the Feder:ation," whose members would 
be elected by members of provincial legislatures and of the House of Commons 
via a form of proportional representation.0 The House of the Federation would 
exercise only a suspensive veto of 120 days ove:r ordinary bills passed by the 
House of Commons (rather than the current absolute veto).44 The Trudeau 
government argued that the 1867 Act granted Parliament authority to effect these 
changes without provincial consent, as it permi1tted Parliament to unilaterally 
amend the "Constitution of Canada."45 
However, the Supreme Court rejected this argument in the 1979 Reference. 
The Supreme Coun read the phrase "Constitution of Canada" narrowly, so as 
to mean only "the constitution of the federal government, as"ilistinct from the 
provincial governments.""' On this reading, Parliament's unilateral amendment 
power extended only to those provisions of the 1'867 Act that were "of Interest 
only to the federal government."47 Since the Sen:ate was intended to safeguard 
regional and provincial interests, changes to the "fundamental character" of the 
Senate would necessarily concern the provinces an.d thus fall outside Parliament's 
unilateral amending power.48 Accordingly, Bill C-60 was abandoned. 
In defining the "fundamental character" of the Senate, the Supreme Court 
relied on statements made by delegates to the Que;bec Conference along with the 
preamble to the 1867 Act, which provides that th•e Constitution was intended to 
be "similar in Principle to that of the United King,dom ... {and to) conduce to the 
Welfare of the Provinces."'" It concluded that any change that would affect the 
Senate's ability "to afford protection to the varioUis sectional interests in Canada 
in relation to the enactment of federal legislation" (i.e., its representative role) or 
to be "a thoroughly independent body which could canvass dispassionately the 
measures of the House of Commons" (i.e., its leg;islative role) would constitute 
a change to the Senate's "fundamental charactc~r."50 Such changes were held 
to include reforms that would reduce Senators' perceived independence by 
requiFing them to stand for election or serve signiificantly shorter terms. 51 
When the Constitution was patriated in 1:982, a new set of amending 
formulae was introduced. These formulae reflc~cted the basic principle laid 
out in the 1979 Reference: while minor changes to the Senate can be made by 
Parliament alone, specific changes likely to affect provincial interests cannot. But 
43 Bill C-60, An Act to amend the Constitution of Ca"ada with respect to matters coming 
within the legislative authority of the Parliament of Canada, and to approve and authorize 
the taking of measures necessary for the amendment of the Constitution with respect to 
certain matters, 3rd Sess, 30th Pari (1st reading 20 june 1978), cl63. 
44 ibid, cl 67. 
45 1979 Reference, supra note 42 at 60. 
46 Ibid at 70. 
4 7 Ibid at 70. 
48 Ibid at 78. 
49 Ibid at 66-67. 
50 Ibid at 77. 
51 Ibid at 76-78. 
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the authors of the 1982 Act abandoned the Supreme Court's broad "fundame:ntal 
character" test for a more specific bargain: while amendments in relation to the 
Senate may generally be made by Parliament alone, changes to the "method of 
selecting Senators and the powers of the Senate/' and "the number of members 
by which a province is entitled to be represented in the Senate and the resid•ence 
qualifications of Senators," may only be enacted with the approval of Parliament 
and at least seven provincial legislatures representing at least 50 percent of the 
population of Canada. 52 
The Mulroney government attempted to forge federal-provincial agreement 
on Senate reform with the 1987 Meech Lake Accord.53 The Accord w.;)llld 
have required the Prime Minister to recommend the appointment of Senators 
selected from a list of nominees compiled by the government of the province 
where a vacancy occurred, until the federal and provincial governments c•:>uld 
unanimously agree on more comprehensive Senate reform.~ The Accord failed 
because the Mulroney government could not attract the level of provincial 
support required under the 1982 Act. 
b. The Elected Senate Model 
In the 1980s, a series of federal and provincial commissions recommended that 
the Constitution be amended so that Senators could be directly elected .. l•s In 
1992, the Mulroney government tried to bring an elected Senate into being 1with 
the Charlottetown Accord. 56 The Accord addressed the possibility of legislative 
deadlock by providing that revenue and expenditure bills passed by the House 
of Commons would be subject only to a 30-day suspensive veto, while other 
bills would still be subject to an absolute veto.5' The Accord was abandoned, 
however, after it was rejected in a referendum held that year. 
Senate reform efforts largely lay dormant until the election of the Harper 
government in 2006. Unlike Prime Minister Mulroney, who sought to reform 
the Senate with the consent of the provinces, Prime Minister Harper has argued 
that Parliament has the authority to implement limited reforms unilaterall}'· To 
this end, the Harper government has introduced seven different Senate reform 
bills prior to .1\ilJ C· 7, all of which died on the order paper before they could be 
passed into law.51 Bill C-7's fate will depend on the Reference. 
52 1982 Act, supra note 1, s 42(l)(b)-(c). Part ID·C. below, addresses the argument that the 
1982 Act did not override the "fundamental character" test. 
53 Canada, Constitutional Amendment, 1987 (Ottawa: Government of Canada, 1987), 
Schedule, s 21Meech Lake Accord}. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Jack Stillborn, «Forty Years of Not Refonning the Senate" in Serge Joyal, ed, Prote,cting 
Canadian Democracy: The Senate You Never Knew (Ottawa: Canadian Centm for 
Management Development, 2003) 31 at 33. 
56 Canada, Comemus RrPort on the Consntution: Charlottetown (28 August 1992, !Final 
Text) (Ottawa: Supply & Services Canada, 1992) at 6-7 [Charlottetown Accord}. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Sebastian Spano, Legiskltive Summary of Bill C·7: An Act respecting the sele.ction 
of senators and amending the Constitution Act, 1867 in respect of Senate term limits 
(Ottawa: Library of Parliament, 2011) at 2·3. 
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Ill. THE CONSTrTUTIONAUTY OF THE BILL C-7 REFORMS 
Bill C-7 remains relevant in determining the constitutionality of the reforms 
'advanced in the Reference. Reference Questions l(a} and 3 ask the Supreme 
Court of Canada to determine the constitutionality of both the term limits and 
provision for Senate nominee elections proposed in Bill C-7. These questions also 
refer the Supreme Court of Canada to particular provisions of Bill C-7. Finally, 
as the Harper government's most recent legislative proposal for Senate reform, 
Bill C-7 offers the best insight into the intentions underlying the proposals 
discussed in the Reference. 
To determine the constitutionality of the reforms proposed in Bill C-7, it is 
necessary to (a) identify the pith and substance of the reforms by examining their 
legal and practical effects, and (b) determine whether this pith :cnchubstance can 
only be enacted by constitutional amendment, and (c) if so, determine which 
amending formulae would apply. 
i. The Pith and Substance of the Bill C-7 Reforms 
To determine the pith and substance of the reforms advanced in Bill C-7, it is 
necessary to examine their legal effects. These can be determined by looking 
at the wording of the questions advanced in the Reference, interpreted in light 
of the text of Bill C-7.59 Where a reform's purpose remains unclear, it will be 
necessary to examine any relevant practical effects of the reform.60 
I argue that the practical effects of the reforms advanced in Bill C-7 are 
relevant to determiniqg their purpose and that, together with the text of Bill 
C 7, they indicate that the pith and substance of these reforms is not merely the 
creation of a consultative framework that may be used by the Prime Minister 
when recommending Senate appointees to the Governor General, but the 
transformation of the Senate into an elected body. 
a. Provision of term limits for Senators 
Question l(a) of the Reference asks whether Parliament has the authority to 
provide for "a fixed term of nine years for Senators, as set out in clause 5 of Bill 
C-7." Clause 5 of Bill C-7 provides that Senators appointed after Bill C-7 comes 
into force would be appointed for one non-renewable nine-year term, subject to 
mandatory retirement at age 75. The text of this clause is sufficiently clear that 
no further analysis is necessary to determine the intent of the clause. 
59 R v Morgentaler, (1993)3 SCR 463 at 482-85, 107 DLR (4th) 537. 
60 The practical effects of legislation are not relevant if they merely show that the legislation 
is likely to be ineffective in meeting its stated objective. It is relevant only to the extent that 
it reveals an alternative purpose to the legislation. Ibid at 485-88. 
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b. Elections C)f Senate Nominees 
(a). Relevant Reference Questions and Text of the Bill 
Question 3 of the Reference asks whether Parliament has the authority to 
"establish a framework setting out a basis for provincial and territorial 
legislatures to enact legislation to consult their population as to their preferences 
for potential mominees for appointment to the Senate as set out in the schedule 
to Bill C-7."61 The schedule to Bill C-7 provides that "Senate nominees for a 
province or territory [are] to be determined by an election held in the province or 
territory."61 Part l of Bill C-7 indicates how this reform could work. [t provides 
that, where a province or territory has enacted legislation substantially in 
accordance with the framework described in the schedule, "the Prime Minister, 
in recommending Senate !lominees to the Governor General, must consider 
names from the.most current list of Senate nominees selected for that province 
or territory."6'3 Where a province or territory does not enact such legislation, 
Senators from that province or territory would be appointed in the same way 
they are now. 
The key issue is whether this reform is intended to implement a consultative 
framework, which the Prim~ Minister may choose to follow or ignore when 
recommending Senate nominees to the Governor General, or for all practical 
purposes bind the Prime Minister's recommendatory power and thus gradually 
transform the~ Senate from a largely appointed body into a wholly elected 
body. The text of Bill C-7 is especially relevant in weighing this issue given 
that, as notedl above, Reference Question 3 refers directly to Bill C-7, and the 
Government of Canada has suggested that the SCC respond to this question in 
light of Bill C· 7. 64 • 
The preamble of Bill C-7 indicates that these reforms are intended to do the 
latter: 
Wherc:as it is appropriate that those whose names are submitted to the 
Queem's Privy Council for Canada for summons to the Senate be determined 
by dC!ITlocratic election by the people of the province or territory that a 
senate~·~; to represent; ... }and! 
Whemas the tenure of senator$ should be comistent with modern democrattc 
princi)rJies;0 
The preamble: also states that "it is important that ... the Senate, continue to 
evolve in acC•lrdance with ... the expectations of Canadians."66 [f a province 
61 1979 Relerence, supra note 42. 
62 Bill C-7, supra note 2, Schedule, cl2. 
63 lbid,cl3. 
64 In the Matter of a Reference by the Governor in Council concerning reform of the Senate, 
as set OJ<rt in Order PC 2013-70, dated February 1, 2013 (35203) (SCC) (Factum of the 
Attorne}r General of Canada at paras 18-19) [GoC Factum!. 
65 Bill C-7, supra note 2, Preamble. 
66 Ibid. 
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were to organize an election for Senate nominees. it would almost certainly be 
the "expectation" of those who voted in that election that the Prime Minister 
would recommend the appointment of the winners of that election.67 
Further evidence of an intention to convert the Senate into an elected body 
can be found in the schedule to Bill C-7, which provides that "Senators to be 
appointed for a province or territory should be chosen from a list of Senate 
nominees submitted by the government of the province or territory ... determined 
by an election held in the province or territory."68 
(b). Practical Effects 
Though Reference Question 3 refers to Senate nominee elections as a 
"consultation" process and Bill C-7 states that the Prime Mi~ister would need 
only "consider" the outcomes of such a consultation, it is alniOst certain that 
a Prime Minister would feel bound to recommend the appointment of any 
person who wins a Senate nominee election held by a provincial government in 
accordance with federallegislation.69 
The consultation process contemplated above has been said to be, in legal 
terms, indistinguishable from a poll or any of the other informal means of 
consultation of which a Prime Minister may take advantage before recommending 
appointments to the Governor General.70 In fact, several significant differences 
are immediately apparent. Individuals voting to elect Senate nominees would 
make definite choices amongst competing candidates about whom they have 
acquired a great deal of information via both the candidates themselves and the 
media. Voters may have had the opportunity to watch the candidates debate 
substantive issues. In addition, voters would demonstrate their commitment to 
their choices by taking time to visit polling statiofis to cast ballots. Finally, such 
elections would be sanctioned by federal legislation. 
On the other hand, individuals participating in a poll express tentative 
opinions, which, if not expressed during an election campaign, would not be 
well-informed by media coverage of the platforms and agendas that would be 
pursued by prospective Senators in office. A tentative opinion expressed by 
a sample of individuals based on little or no information does not carry the 
same weight as the informed, considered opinion of the whole of an electorate 
expressed in an election. Informal consultation with a provincial government 
is also unlikely to carry the same weight as a formal election, given that 
individuals recommended pursuant to such a mechanism would also lack the 
clear democratic mandates that would be enjoyed by individuals who succeed in 
federally-sanctioned Senate nominee elections. 
Finally, because Senate nominee elections would be sanctioned by federal 
legislation, they are also distinguishable from the elections held pursuant 
67 House of Commons, Legislative Committee on Bill C-20, Evidence, 39th Pari, 2nd sess, 
No 5 { 16 April 2008) at 3 (Hogg Evidence!. 
68 Bill C-7,supra note 1, Schedule, cis 1-2. 
69 Hogg Evidence, supra note 67 at 3. 
70 Ibid at 2. 
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to Alberta's Senatorial Selection Act/1 which have generally not led to the 
appointment of successful candidates.72 The constitutional validity of this 
legislation, as noted below in part lii-B-2, is dubious at be~t. Furthermore, two 
of the major parties in Alberta-the Liberals and the NDP-have boycotted 
every Alberta Senate election since 1989.n A federally sanctioned election that 
is deemed constitutionally valid, and which as a result would likely attract 
candidates from all major political parties, would enjoy far more political 
legitimacy-and impose a far stronger political obligation on the Prime Minister 
to recommend the appointment of successful candidates-than the pr<ltCess 
currently in place in Alberta. 
In summary, the likely practical effects of the "consultation" prctcess 
described in Bill C-7 and Reference Question 3 would be to bind the discretion 
of the Prime Minister with respect to the appointment of Senators. ThereJfore, 
the pith and substance of Reference Questions l(a) and 3, as reflected in Bill C-7, 
appears to be to transform the Senate into an elected body. 
ii. To what extent must the Constitution be amended before Bill C-7 rnay 
be enacted? 
It is now necessary to determine to what extent the Constitution would need 
to be amended before Parliament could achieve the objectives associated with 
Bill C-7's pith and substance. This requires examination of both the text and 
purpose of those provisions of the Constitution that define the basic structure 
of the Senate.74 As Bill C-7 already makes clear that the government accepts 
that Senate term limits would require amendments to the 1867 Act, I will focus 
on the proposals for the election of Senate nominees and the delegatio1n of 
responsibility for holding these elections to the Senate described in Bill C-7 and 
Reference Question 3.75 
I argue that neither of these reforms could be implemented without amending 
the 1867 Act. The creation of a process for the election of Senate nomine,es-
which would, as argued in the previous section,. have the effect of transforming 
the Senate in~.:an elected body-contradicts the purpose of section 24 of the 
1867 Act, which was to provide for the appointment of non-elected Sena.tors 
so that the Senate could "canvass dispassionately" measures passed by the 
House of Commons.'' The delegation of responsibility for the organizatio1n of 
Senate nominee elections to the provinces would also require an amendment 
to the constitutional division of powers, as Parliament currently has exclusive 
jurisdiction over parliamentary elections.77 
71 RSA 2000, c S-5 . 
72 GoC Factum, supra note 64 at paras 132-33. 
73 Alfie Mfilean, .. Alberta to hold another nominee selection vme" Edmonton journal 
(30 January 2010) A3. 
74 See e.g. 1867 Act, supra note 6, ss 21-36. See also Part ll-A above. 
75 Bill C.7, supra note 2, cis 4-5. 
76 1979 Reference, supra note 42 at 77. 
77 McKayvTheQueen, [1965}SCR 798 at 806,53 DLR (2d) 532 [McKay}; 1979 Refer,ence, 
1bid at 77. 
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a. Elections of Senate Nominees 
Section 24 of the 1867 Act specifies that "(t]he Governor General shall from 
Time to Time ... summon qualified Persons to the Senate."78 No provision of the 
1867 Act explicitly requires that the Governor General undertake any particular 
process prior to summoning an individual to the Senate. The Governor General 
is only bound by the convention that he or she appoint qualified persons 
recommended by the Prime Minister." 
It has been argued that in the absence of textual provisions that define how 
the Governor General must appoint Senators or how the Prime Minister must 
go about recommending Senators, section 24 should be read as permissive, 
allowing Parliament to prescribe any process that it deems desirable without 
necessitating a constitutional amendment.80 But a reading of section 24 of the 
1867 Act together with other provisions of the ConstitutiaR, including the 
preamble to the 1867 Act and the amending formulae set out in Part V of the 
1982 Act, indicates that section 24 was intended not merely to provide that 
Senators would be appointed, but also to exclude the possibility that Senators 
would be dected, whether directly or indirectly.81 
Such a reading indicates that the selection process set out in section 24 was 
intended not merely to provide that Senators would be appointed, but also 
to exclude the possibility that Senators would be elected, whether directly or 
indirectly (just as must be the case with the Governor General). On this reading, 
the election process provided for in Bill C-7 could only be enacted if section 24 
is amended to permit the election of Senators or Senate nominees. 
The preamble to the 1867 Act provides that Canada is to have a Constitution 
"similar in principle to that of the United Kingdom". The SCC has inte.rpreted 
as an indication that the Senate, like the UK House of Lords, must be appointed 
and not elected: 
78 See also 1867 Act, supra note 6, s 32. This provision duplicates s 24, providing that "When 
a Vacancy happens in rhe Senate by Resignation, Death, or othetWi~, the Governor 
General shall by Summons to a fit and qualified Person fill the Vacancy." 
79 See Heard, Conventions, supra note 21 at 34-40 {noting that all of the Governor General's 
powers ate by convention exercised only on the Prime Minister's recommendation, save 
for decisions to summon, dissolve, or possibly prorogue Parliament, and decisions to 
appoint or dismiss the Prime Minister) . Conventions are constitutional rules that may be 
recognized, but not enforced, by a court. They are political in nature, created by political 
acts and enforced through political processes. These political acts include consistent 
practice and explicit agreement, either of which may give rise tO a convention if they are 
regarded as binding by political actors and there is a principled reason why they should 
be enforced. See Reference Re Resolution to amend the Constitution, 1198111 SCR 753 
at 888, (sub l"t{)m Reference Re Amendment of the Constitution of Canada (Nos 1, 2 and 
3)) 125 DLR (3d) 1. 
80 See e.g. Debates of the Senate, 40rh Pari, 3rd Sess, Vol 147, No 40 {17 June 2010) at 846 
(Hon Bob Runciman). 
81 Secrion 24 should also be read in light of the convention that the Governor General must 
appoint whomever is recommended by the Prime Minister. See supra note 77; Heard, 
Conventions. supra note 1 at 3-4, 18 {discusses the distinction berween the interpretation 
of a statute in light of a convention, which courts are permitted to do, from enforcing a 
convention, which courts are not permitted to do). 
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The substitution of a system of election lor a system of appomtment ... 
would involve a radical change 1n the natu1re of one of the component parts 
of Parlzament. As already noted, the prearmble to the Act refe"ed to "a 
constitutiOn similar in principle to that of 1!he United Kingdom», where the 
Upper House is not elected. u 
VQI,.. 7(1(2} 
The Supreme Court has similarly relied O•n the preamble in other cases where 
it was necessary to clarify the powers, privileges, or characteristics of the Ho~se 
of Commons and the Senate.83 
Paragraph 42(1)(b) of the 1982 Act lends further support to a reading of 
section 24 that excludes the possibility of holding Senate elections (whether 
directly or indirectly through the election of Senate nominees). Paragraph 
42(1)(b) refers to amendments to the Consititution concerning the "method of 
selecting Senators." [n so doing, it implies th!at the method of selecting Senators 
is prescribed by the Constitution-if this we:re not the case, paragraph 42(1)(b) 
would be meaningless.S4 
[n summary, a contextual reading of setction 24 of the 1867 Act indicates 
that Senators are to be appointed and not elected, therefore any legislation that 
has the effect of converting the Senate into an elected body cannot be enacted 
without an, amendment to section 24. The preamble to the 1867 Act states that 
82 1979 Reference, supra note 42 at 77. 
83 See e.g. New Brunswick Broadcasting Co 11 No110 Scotia (Speaker of the House of 
Assembly), 1199311 SCR 319 at 378-85, 118 NSR {2d) 181 JNB Broadcasting! (Where 
McLachlinj, as she then was, relied on it the pn:amble in holding that Canad1an legislatures 
are entitled to parliamentary privileges similar to those enjoyed by the UK Parliament); 
Authorson II Canada (AG}, 2003 sec 39 at para 41, [20031 2 SCR 40 {where Major 
j relied on rhe preamble in rejecting a claim that the Canadian Bill of Rights requires 
Parliament to consult affected individuals bdore enacting legislation). Preambles have 
no legal force in themselves, and it should be noted that courtS are generally reluctant 
to use the preamble to import unwrinen consuitutional pr-:,visions that limit Parliament's 
authority. See Reference Re Remuneration o/' judges of the Provincial Court of Prince 
Edward Island, [19971 3 SCR 3 at para 104., 156 NAd & PEIR 1; Babcock 11 Canada 
(AG), 2002 SCC 57 at paras 53-57, [2002]3 SCR 3. 
84 A similar argument has been advanced with 1respect to amendments to the composition 
of the ~e Court of Canada. Several scholars argue that because paragraph 41{d) 
of the 1982 Act states that any amendment ~egarding "the composition of the Supreme 
Court of Canada" must be approved by Parliament and all of the provincial legislatures, 
the composition of the Supreme Coun must be part of the Constitution of Canada, even 
though the Supreme Court Act has not been, included in the schedule of Acts deemed 
to have constitutional status. See e.g. Rl Cheiffins, "The Constitution Aa, 1982 and the 
Amending Formula: Pol itical and Legallmpli.cations" (1982) 4 Sup Ct L Rev 43 at 53; 
.WR Lederman,. "Canadian Constitutional Amending Procedures: 1867-1982" {1984) 
32 Am j Comp L 339; SA Scon, "The Canadian Amendment Process: Mechanisms and 
Prospects" in Cj Backton & AW Mackay, ed~:, Recurring Issues in Canadian Federalism 
{Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986) i'7. These provisions would be incorporated 
into the Constitution via section 52(2) of the 1982 Act, which states that the Constitution 
of Canada "includes," and is therefore not limited to, the statutes listed in the Schedule; 
supra note 1. The meaning of .. composition" is far from clear; it may mean that some 
provisions of the Supreme Court Act, but not ;otherS, hold constitutional status. See Peter 
Oliver, "Canada, Qul!bec, and Constitutional Amendment" (1999) 49 UTLJ 519 at 579· 
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Canada is to have a constitution similar to that of the United Kingdom, whose 
upper bouse is not elected; the 1982 Act also indicates that the current method 
of selecting Senators may only be changed by constitutional amendment. 
b. Delegation of authority over Senate nominee elections to the 
provinces 
The division of powers between Parliament and the provincial legislatures 
imposes a second constitutional hurdle to the kind of Senate reform described 
in Reference Question 3 and Bill C-7. In both McKayl5 and the 1979 Reference, 
the SCC stated that Parliament bas sole jurisdiction over the organization of 
Parliamentary elections, whether to the House of Commons or the Senate.'6 
This means that even if the Constitution of Canada permitted elections relating 
to the Senate, the provinces would not have jurisdiction to organize them absent 
a Constitutional amendment explicitly authorizing them to do so. This calls into 
question not only the constitutional validity of the reforms proposed in Bill C-7, 
but of existing provincial legislation purporting to provide for Senate elections.s' 
In McKay, the Supreme Court addressed the question of whether a municipal 
by-law prohibiting the erection of billboards applied to signs advertising 
candidates for Parliament. This required the Supreme Court to answer the 
broader question of whether elections for Parliament fall under exclusive 
federal jurisdiction. Justice Cartwright, writing for the majority, answered in the 
affirmative: "the subject matter of elections to Parliament appears to me to be 
from its very nature one which cannot be regarded as coming within any of the 
classes of subjects assigned to the legislatures of the provinces."88 
In the 1979 Reference, the Supreme Court reached the same conclusion when 
considering whether Parliament could enact legislation permitting the provinces 
to select Senators. It stated that the selection of Senators was a matter of federal 
jurisdiction and that, as a result, the delegation of responsibility for the selection 
of Senators to the provinces "would involve an indirect participation by the 
provinces in the enactment of federallegislation,"89 which would be contrary to 
the general constitutional rule that one legislature cannot delegate its powers to 
another.90 
If the provinces are to be involved in the selection of Senators to the degree 
contemplated in Bill C-7, it will be necessary not only to amend the Constitution 
to provide for an elected, term-limited Senate, but also to provide the provinces 
with jurisdiction to organize elections to the Senate. Though one could argue 
that legislation providing for the selection of Senators is distinguishable from 
legislation providing for the selection of "Senate nominees" as contemplated in 
Bill C-7, this argument is likely to fail for the same reasons offered in Part Ill-A. 
85 McKay, supra note 77. 
86 Ibid at 806; 1979 Reference, supra note 42 at 77. 
87 Sec Senatorial Selection Act, supra note 71. As of August 2013, the constitutional validity of 
this statute has not been challenged in cou11. 
88 McKay, supra note 77 at 806. 
89 1979 Reference, supra note 42 at n. 
90 Ibid; Nova Scotia (Attorney-General) 11 Canada (Attorney-General), (19511 SCR 31, 
[195014 DLR 369. 
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iii. If the Constitution must be amended, \l\lhkh amending fonnula would 
apply? 
Though Pan III(ii) argued that constitutional amendments are necessary 
before Parliament could implement the refo1rms described in Bill C-7, this does 
not necessarily mean that Parliament must attain provincial approval before 
making these amendments. Parliament is generally permitted to unilaterally 
amend provisions of the Constitution "in rdation to ... the Senate and House 
of Commons" under section 44 of the 1982 Act, subject to exceptions listed in 
sections 41-42. The exception most relevant here is paragraph 42(1)(b), which 
requires that an amendment to "the powers of the Senate and the method of 
selecting Senators" be approved under the section 38 formula-that is, by 
Parliamen~ and at least seven provincial legislatures representing at least 50% of 
the population of Canada. Changes to the division of powers between Parliament 
and the provincial legislatures are also subje-;;t to this formula. 
a. Election of Senate nominees and del~.,atlon of authority to the 
provinces 
As discussed in Pan Ul(i), the Senate nomin•ee election process described in the 
Reference and Bill C-7 would have the effect of transforming the Senate into an 
elected body. It is therefore a change in the method of selecting Senators that 
engages paragraph 42(1)(b) of the 1982 ACl~ and requires provincial approval. 
As discussed in Pan ID(ii}, delegation of the power to enact legislation providing 
for elections for Senate nominees to provi~tcial legislatures would amend the 
division of powers; it therefore would also lbe invalid without the approval of 
the provinces as provided in the formula desc:ribed in section 38 of the 1982 Act. 
b. Provision of term fimits for Senators 
Even if the sec holds that Parliament C~tnnot unilaterally provide for the 
Senate nominee elections described in Question 3 of the Reference, the SCC can 
separately consider whether the term limit contemplated Question l(a) and Bill 
C-7 could be enacted by Parliament alone, pursuant to its unilateral amending 
power under section 41 of the 1982 Act. I argue that this term limit, considered 
alone, would not require provincial appronl, as it would affect neither the 
powers of the Senate nor the means by which Senators are selected. 
The key issue here is whether the central holding of the 1979 Reference, 
that the "fundamental character" of the Senate cannot be changed unilaterally 
by Parliament, has any bearing on this issu<:.91 Proponents of the fundamental 
character test argue that the 1979 Reference retains force, either because it sets 
out an unwritten amending formula, or because it aids in the interpretation of s 
42(1)(b) of the 1982 Act.92 
91 This holding is separate from its discussion of federal jurisdiction over the selection of 
Senators, which does not depend on the "fundamental character" test and was not ousted 
by the 1982 N.t. Hence, the discussion in this Pa1t does not affect the argumentS made with 
respect to the provinces' lack of jurisdiction over the selection of Senators as discussed in 
Part ffi-B. 
92 Bill S-4 Observations, supra note 3 at 1670-n. 
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The "fundamental character" test appears to have been extinguished entirely 
by the 1982 Act. As noted in Part lil above, this test hinged on the interpretation 
of the phrase "Constitution of Canada." Section 52 of the 1982 Act now makes 
clear that the "Constitution of Canada" includes the 1867 Act in its entirety, 
effectively reversing the 1979 Reference on this point. Furthermore, the Supreme 
Court has confirmed that the amending formulae set out in Part V of the 1982 
Act "contains a new procedure for amending the Constitution of Canada which 
entirely replaces the old one."93 It has been argued that there may be unwritten 
checks on Parliament's power to unilaterally enact amendments in relation to 
the House of Commons and the Senate in addition to sections 41-42 of the 
1982 Act (e.g. to prevent Parliament from unilaterally extending the House of 
Commons' usual maJcimum term beyond five years).94 Even if such checks were 
necessary, which is doubtful at best, this does not lead to the ~onclusion that the 
"'fundamental character" test must remain valid.95 - ,.. 
ln addition, the "'fundamental character" test is likely of little value 
in interpreting paragraph 42(1)(b) of the 1982 Act. That the authors of the 
Constitution chose not to incorporate the broad phrase "'fundamental character" 
into s 42(1)(b), and instead used the more specific phrase "method of selecting 
Senators and the powers of the Senate," i'ndicates an intention to bring precision 
to this amending formula that would only be frustrated by reading in the 
"fundamental character" test.96 
The phrase "powers of the Senate" most likely refers to changes to the 
Senate's legal powers to review, amend, and veto bills passed by the House 
of Commons. But it is possible that the Senate's "powers", read broadly to 
include the "rights and privileges" enjoyed by Senators/' also include Senators' 
institutional independence from the government of the day. lf this is the case, a 
tdm limit that effectively prevents Senators from acting independently-from 
exercising their responsibility to "canvass dispassionately" the work of the 
House of Commons-would require provincial consent. 
But there is little evidence that any of the non-renewable term limits proposed 
in the Reference, including the term limit proposed in Bill C-7, .would have this 
effect. ln fact, the evidence that does exist suggests the contrary. For example, 
a recent study indicates that Senators who have served eight years or fewer in 
93 Reference re. Objection by Quebec to a Resolution to amend the Constitution !198212 
SCR 793 at 806, (Sub nom Quibec (AG) 11 Canada (AG)) 140 DLR (3d) 385. See also 
Hogan 11 Newfoundland (AG),2000 NFCA 12 at para 73,189 Nfld & PEIR 183. 
94 Bill S-4 Observations, supra note 3 at 1672. 
95 The changes described above could only be made if the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms is amended to abrogate the democratic rights guaranteed under sections 3·4. 
It is doubtful that any such amendment could be characterized as an amendment solely 
in relation to the House of Commons or the Senate that could be made unilaterally by 
Parliament. See Canadian Charter of Rights and FreedomS, being Part I of the 1982 Act, 
supra note 1, ss 3-4. 
96 Patrick Monahan, Constitutional Law, 3d ed (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2006) at 203-204. 
97 Daphne Dukelow, ed, Pocket Dictionary of Canadian Law, 5th ed (Toronto: Carswell, 
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office are as likely to vote independently of their party as more senior Senaton.98 
Given that Prime Ministers have traditionally appointed Senators who are not 
members of their party when necessary to ensure that there is a minimum 
level of opposition representation in the Senate,'9 it is doubtful that the entire 
Senate could be populated by members of the governing party (as some have 
predicted}.100 On this basis, the nine-year, non-renewable term limit proposed 
in Bill C-7 and Question 1 (a} of the Reference should not be problematic. The 
non-renewable term limits of ten and eight years, proposed in Questions l.(b} 
and (c) of the Reference, respectively, should also pass muster.101 
But the renewable eight-year term proposed Question l(e} of the Reference 
would likely raise difficulties, to the extent that it creates a possibility that 
Senators will seek to curry favour with the Prime Minister of the day to secure 
reappointment. 101 This possibility was one of the reasons that the delegates to the 
Quebec Conference ultimately decided not to give Senators limited, renewa.ble 
terms.103 Given that, over the past thirty years, two Prime Ministers have served 
for more than eight years (and that Prime Minister Harper wiU also pass this 
threshold if he serves past February 2014), this possibility cannot be dismissed. 
In summary, the only amending formulae that apply to the reforms descrilbed 
in the Reference and Bill C· 7 are those set out in Part V of the 1982 Act, wbt.ich 
replaced the fundamental character test stated in the 1979 Reference. Th:ese 
amending formulae allow for the unilateral enactment of the term limits 
contemplated in Bill C-7 and Question l(a} of the Reference, but not the 
elections for Senate nominees contemplated in Bill C-7 and the Reference. 
IV. SENATE REFORM, FEDERAUSM, AND DEMOCRACY 
Many would likely VIew the outcome of the analysis described above as 
intolerable. Polls show that Canadians' support for the status quo in the Senate 
98 Andrew ~J'd , "AS$e$sing Senate Reform through Bill C-19: The Effects of Limited Terms 
for Senaro.S" in Jennifer Smith, eel, The Demo"atic Dilemma: Reforming the Canadian 
Senate (Kingston & Montreal: MeGill-Queen's Univers ity Press, 2009) 117 at 134·36. 
99 See supra nor~ 32 and accompanying discussion. 
100 See e.g. Houu o{Commom Debates, 40th Pari, 3rd Sess, Voi145,No 36 (29 April2Cil0) 
at 2144 Uoyce Murray). 
101 These Referena questions are phrased as follows: "In relation to each of the following 
proposed limits to the tenure of Senators, is it wirhm the leg~slative authority of the 
Parliament of Canada, acting pursuant to section 44 o f the Constitution Act, 1982~ to 
make amendments to section 29 of the Constitution Act, 1867 providing for (a) a fixed 
term of n ine years for Senators, as~ out in c::lause 5 of Bill C·7, the Senate Reform Ac::t; 
(b) a fixed term of ten years or more for Senators; lot} (c) a fuctd term of eight years or 
leSS for Senators."' 
102 !his reference queStion refers to the term limit set out in Bill $-4, which is a renewable 
term of eight years. See Bill S-4, An Act to amend the Comtitution Aa, 1867 (Senate 
tenure), 1st Sess, 39th Pan, 2005, cl2 (1st reading 30 May 2005). 
103 Quebec Conference, Suprtl note 17 at 90. 
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is almost non~existent. 104 Given that the provinces' constirutional jurisdiction 
to hold Senate nominee elections is questionable at best, as indicated by McKay 
and the 1979 Reference, it is unlikely that many provinces will join Alberta in 
organizing such elections. How does it serve the principles of federalism and 
democracy-principles that the SCC has concluded underlie the Constitution of 
Canada-to prevent Parliament from converting an unelected Senate incapable 
of effectively representing regional interests into a democratically elected Senate 
that would likely emerge as a strong voice for regional interests? 105 
In brief, this outcome is justified because the principle of federalism implies 
that the provinces will have some influence on important constitutional changes 
likely to affect their interests. In addition, it is far from clear that democracy 
would be served by creating an elected house with a political mandate (and legal 
power) to frustrate the work of the House of Commons and possibly undermine 
the principle of responsible government, particularly when Cifiadians have not 
had a chance to make clear what form of Senate reform they prefer (or whether 
they want a Senate at all). 
i. The Principle of Federalism 
According to former Chief Justice Richard of the Federal Court of Appeal, 
the adoption of federalism in Canada was a natural consequence of its "large 
geographic size, the presence of two founding languages, and the diversity and 
distinctiveness of its regional cultures and economies." 106 The SCC has added 
that federalism provides a "political mechanism by which diversity could be 
reconciled with unity" 107-a mechanism that increasingly requires that "complex 
governance problems" be resolved "not by the bare logic of either/or, but by 
seeking cooperative solutions that meet the needs of the country as a whole as 
well as its constituent parts."108 
The path to Senate reform charted by the Harper government is difficult 
to reconcile with this conception of federalism. The Senate nominee elections 
proposed by Bill C-7, if implemented, would affect the interests of the provincial 
governments by diluting the influence that comes from their current role as 
the primary spokespersons for regional and provincial interests. Though Bill 
C-7 provides provinciallegislarures with a formal choice as to whether to hold 
Senate nominee elections, this choice is designed to force a particular outcome. 
Provincial legislatures would be required to choose between (a) ceding some of 
their governments' political clout to elected Senate nominees, and (b) being seen 
as helping to uphold an unpopular appointed Senate and denying their electors 
104 bic Grenier, "Canadians wane to reform or abolish Senate: polls", The Globe and Mail 
(30 May 2013) online: The Globe and Mail <http://www.theglobeandmail.com>. 
105 Secession Reference, Supra note 5 ac para 32. 
106 Chief justice John D Richard, "Federalism in Canada" (Address delivered ac an 
incemational seminar for Uniced Scares lawye.rS, 12-13 November 2004), online: Federal 
Court of Appeal <http://www.fca·caf.gc.ca/bullecinslspeecheslfederalism_e.shcml>. 
107 SeceSsion Reference, supra noce 5 ac para 43. 
108 Reference Re Securities Act, 201 1 SCC 66 at para 132, 12011!3 SCR 837. 
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the same chance to influence federal politics enjoyed by electors in provinces 
that do provide for the election of Senate: nominees. Provincial legislatures 
would have little practical choice but to choose option (a). 
It has long been recognized that the provil!lcial governments have a legitimate 
interest in influencing the course of Senate reform. The 1979 Reference protected 
this influence by placing limits on Parliament's capacity to unilaterally change 
the Senate-limits that were given more specificity with the 1982 Act. It is also 
of note that neither the elected American Senate nor the elected Australian 
Senate came about as a result of unilateral federal action. Both were the result 
of intense lobbying campaigns by the representatives of these countries' state 
governments, followed by agreement between these states.109 
Though the Senate nominee elections proposed in Bill C-7 are intended 
to support federalism by lending regional and local interests a stronger voice 
in the course of Canadian government, the unilateral implementation of this 
reform would seem to be incompatible with federalism. It would disregard the 
provincial governments' legitimate interest in1 the course of Senate reform, and it 
would preclude a federal-provincial conversation regarding what reforms would 
best serve both federal and provincial interes;ts. 
li. Demoaacy 
It might seem to be common sense that the pritnciple of democracy would strongly 
favour federal action to enact an elected SeiUate. But "democracy" means more 
than elections, particularly when read in light of Canada's particular political and 
constitutional traditions. The SCC's Secession Reference offers useful guidance 
on the nature of these traditions. One of the traditions it cites is "representative 
and responsible government."110 This tradition, together with the principle 
of federalism, provide for a system whereby a national legislative majority 
exercises control over national concerns, while different provincial legislative 
majorities exercise control over local concems.111 In addition to majority rule, 
the Secession Reference notes that democracy contemplates "a continuous 
process of di§fJ.t~sion" that allows for a true "marketplace of ideas."112 This 
process of "discussion ... compromise, negotiation, and deliberation" is intended 
to ensure that the majorities that do develop are reasoned, informed, and show 
due concern for the interests of minorities.U3 
The reforms described in Bill C-7 could effc:ct a departure from these traditions. 
First, the conversion of the Senate from an appointed body to an elected one 
would likely affect the Senate's ability to investigate and report on public policy 
issues, a role that helps further the kind o.f discussion and deliberation that 
contributes to our democracy. This is becauHe elected Senators would likely be 
109 Beem4n, supra note 33 at 154-56;Aroney,supra note 38 at 200·201. 
110 Secession Reference, Supra note 5 at pata 65. 
111 IbiiJ at para 66. 
112 Ibid at para 68. 
113 Ibid. 
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subject to many of the same constraints that currently compromise elected MPs' 
ability to carry out this role, such as more significant political and constituency 
responsibilities. 11~ The second and more important departure, however, would 
result from the possibility that elected Senators would feel they had a mandate 
to exercise their legislative powers in the same way as MPs, and as such would 
be less likely to defer to the considered will of the House of Commons. This 
raises the possibility of legislative deadlock, whereby the will of a house where 
seats are distributed on the basis of equality of regions could frustrate the will of 
a house where seats are distributed on the basis of representation by population. 
This situation poses little problem for the American Senate because American 
democracy is guided by different principles, namely the principles of checks and 
balances and separation of powers. Under this system, the executive does not 
require the legislature's support to remain in office, and as . n~sult legislative 
deadlock does not threaten the government's survival. Checks and balances are 
seen as essential to the accountable operation of government rather than as a 
threat to the effective operation of government. 
But legislative deadlock does pose a significant problem for democracies 
guided by the principle of responsible government. While the Australian 
Constitution addresses this problem by providing for double dissolution in 
the event of deadlock, and the Charlottetown Accord would have addressed 
this problem by limiting the Senate's power to veto bills passed by the House 
of Commons, Bill C-7 does not (and constitutionally could not) address this 
problem by modifying the powers of the Senate. As a result, the reforms 
contemplated in :Bill C-7 could threaten the representative house's control over 
the course of government, along with the principle of responsible government 
that has guided Canada's d~mocratic institutions since Confederation. 
Of course, traditions should not be followed for their own sake. If Canadians 
want these traditions to change in the way contemplated by Bill C-7, then these 
changes should be brought about. But it is far from clear that Canadians want 
an elected Senate-polls indicate that almost as many Canadians would prefer 
that the Senate be abolished altogether. us More importantly, the Constitution of 
Canada sets out a precise framework whereby the views of Canadians regarding 
changes to means of selecting Senators can be ascertained and effected-via the 
process of constitutional deliberation and amendment described in paragraph 
41( l)(b) of the 1982 Act. The implications an elected Senate would have for the 
nature of our democracy are too significant to be brought about via the "Senate 
nominee" shortcut contemplated in Bill C-7. 
114 See generaUy Part 11-ii-c above. 
115 Grenier, supra nore 104. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
ln McKay, Justice Cartwright wrote, "just as the legislature cannot do indirecdy 
what it cannot do direcdy, it cannot by using general words effect a result which 
would be beyond its powers if brought about by precise words." 116 The "Senate 
nominee" elections proposed in Bill C-7 are an attempt to effect just such a 
result by just those means, and it is for this reason that this aspect of the Bill is 
unconstitutional. 
With the 1982 Act, the federal governrment and nine of ten provincial 
governments agreed that if the method of sellecting Senators is to be changed, a 
substantial majority of the provinces must consent to this change. By trying to 
evade this agreement by the means provided in Bill C-7, the Harper government 
risks undermining the principles of federali:sm and democracy that undergird 
Canada's political and legal culture. It would ;disregard the provinces' significant, 
legitimate interest in the future of the Senate:. It would create an elected upper 
house that would inevitably come into conjflict with the House of Commons, 
without providing for a means by which deadlock between the two houses 
would be resolved, and as a result put the principle of responsible government 
(a key component of Canadian democracy) a1t risk. 
Plainly, the status quo in the Senate is unacceptable. But both the provisions 
and the principles of our Constitution require that, if Senate reform is to 
be carried out, it must be carried out with the agreement of the federal and 
provincial governments. If we try to avoid this requirement by relying on half-
measures that try to exploit imagined loopholes in the Constitution, we risk 
doing even greater harm to our federal democracy than is arguably caused by 
an unelected Senate. 
~· ... 
116 McKay, supra note 77 at 806. 
